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 1 Introduction
Workers experience very di￿erent labor market outcomes at di￿erent stages of their work-
ing lives. In many countries, young workers su￿er high rates of unemployment and job
separation, which is sometimes referred to as a youth unemployment problem. Workers
who become unemployed close to the retirement age, on the other hand, often face greater
di￿culties in ￿nding a job than their younger peers. Many of these conditions are also
present in the Japanese labor market. However, while the U.S. data, for example, dis-
plays declining levels in unemployment, job-￿nding and job-separation rates with age, in
Japan the unemployment and separation rates are U-shaped. Such patterns may re￿ect
idiosyncrasies of the so-called Japanese employment system.
The main objective of this paper is to build a life-cycle model that captures the main
characteristics of Japan’s labor market. In particular, we develop a life-cycle labor search
and matching model that incorporates some of the key institutional features in Japan. We
subsequently calibrate the model to match the long-run empirical evidence, and compare
its predictions of three key variables, the job-￿nding, separation, and unemployment rates,
with the data. We then study model’s behavior under a permanent decline in productivity,
and compare its numerical implications to the labor market change that took place in Japan
from the 1990s to the 2000s.
While it is often argued that the Japanese labor market is in many respects di￿erent
from those of Europe or the U.S., there are clear similarities in the life-cycle patterns of
some variables that de￿ne workers’ labor market experiences. As shown in Esteban-Pretel
and Fujimoto (2010), unemployment, job separation, and job-￿nding rates in the U.S. are
all highest for young workers and decline with age. This is also true in Japan, but in the
Japanese case, unemployment and separation rates increase after the age of 50, although
they never reach the level of the youngest age group. Hence, while in the U.S. these
variables basically decline monotonically with age, unemployment and separation rates in
Japan are U-shaped. Moreover, the levels of these variables are generally lower in Japan
compared to the U.S. Part of the di￿erence in the shape of age pro￿les and the levels of
these variables may be due to particularities in the Japanese labor market, such as severe
restrictions to dismiss workers, widespread adoption of a mandatory retirement system,
and a universal, highly organized job search during the last years of school.
In order to account for these features in the Japanese labor market, we build a model
in the style of the recent life-cycle search and matching models such as Cheron, Hairault,
and Langot (2008) and Hahn (2009), which di￿er from the textbook models 1 in assuming
1See, e.g., Pissarides (2000).
1the ￿nite life of workers. We further introduce several innovations to quantitatively explain
general and Japan-speci￿c features of the data. As in Esteban-Pretel and Fujimoto (2010),
we incorporate random match quality, which is not necessarily known at match formation
but is revealed after the ￿rst period of employment. As shown in Esteban-Pretel and
Fujimoto (2010), the uncertainty in match quality delivers a declining separation rate as
workers age, which the stylized model of Cheron, Hairault, and Langot (2008) does not
obtain. We introduce other elements to capture some of the Japanese market idiosyncrasies:
in particular, we assume that workers start searching for jobs before entry into the labor
market, that it is costly to dismiss workers, and that that cost declines after the mandatory
retirement age.
The model reproduces the empirical age pro￿les of the variables of interest well. In
particular, our model generates the U-shaped unemployment and separation rates, as well
as the declining job-￿nding rate, through the following mechanisms. First, the decline of
the job-￿nding rate with age can be understood as follows: since we assume that workers
of all ages are pooled into a single labor market, they all face the same probability of being
matched with a ￿rm. Age variations in the job-￿nding rate are therefore explained by
di￿erences in the probability that a match becomes a productive job. Older workers have
shorter employment horizons ahead of them, which reduces the expected value of a job and
thus makes ￿rms more selective in hiring these workers, reducing their job-￿nding rate.
This circumstance, already present in Cheron, Hairault, and Langot (2008), is known as
the horizon e￿ect.
The horizon e￿ect, combined with the assumption that the ￿ring cost is lower after a
certain age, corresponding to the mandatory retirement age in Japan, yields a rise in the
model separation rate during the last years in the labor market. However, the horizon
e￿ect alone generates an upward-sloping separation rate; this contradicts the empirical age
pro￿le, for which the separation rate is declining up to the prime age.
In our model, the existence of random match quality reverses this counterfactual pre-
diction of the stylized model. This is through the destruction of many matches that are
revealed as being of low quality, which occurs more frequently for younger workers for
several reasons. First, young workers are more likely to ￿nd themselves in the ￿rst period
of employment relationships, where the match quality may still be unknown. We assume
that the probability of immediate match quality revelation is lower for younger workers,
who have less experience in the labor market. Finally, since younger workers have a longer
horizon before them, they have stronger incentives to leave a match that is revealed to
be of low quality, and to seek better options. Overall, the horizon e￿ect, the ￿ring cost,
and the match quality produce in the model the U-shaped separation rate observed in the
2data.
Finally, our model yields a U-shaped unemployment rate across ages close to that in the
data. This is because, in our model, many young workers enter the labor market without
a job and face higher separation rates, which in fact dominates the e￿ect of their higher
job-￿nding rates. The higher separation rate and lower job-￿nding rate for older workers
generate their higher unemployment rate.
We also explore the predictions of the model for a permanent decline in productivity.
This is a particularly interesting experiment for the Japanese economy as, following the
seminal work of Hayashi and Prescott (2002), it has been argued in the literature that
productivity declines produced the so-called ￿lost decade￿ of the 1990s. We ￿nd that our
model, following an empirically plausible decline in productivity, generates a decrease in
the job-￿nding rate and an increase in the unemployment rate similar in magnitude to those
observed in Japan between the 1990s and the 2000s. However, the model fails to deliver
the rise in separation rate seen during this period. The increase in unemployment and the
decrease in the job-￿nding rate in the model are explained by the drop in pro￿ts, which
follows the decline in productivity and reduces the incentives for ￿rms to post vacancies.
However, such a decline in the job-￿nding rate also reduces the outside option values for
workers. This e￿ect, together with the presence of a ￿ring cost, makes the separation rate
largely insensitive to declines in productivity.
Our paper is related to two strands of literature. First, it expands the growing literature
that embeds a life-cycle or overlapping generations structure into labor search and matching
models. This area was initiated by Pissarides (1992), which uses a two-period random
matching model to study the e￿ects of skill loss on the persistence of unemployment over
the business cycle. Recent models allow far more general speci￿cations in which workers
live for many periods (Cheron, Hairault, and Langot (2008)) or for a constant duration in
continuous time (Hahn (2009)), enabling more realistic analyses over the life-cycle. Menzio,
Telyukova, and Visschers (2010) develops a life-cycle directed search model and attempts
to match key facts over worker life-cycle, but di￿ers from our model in adopting long-term
contracts and allowing the labor market to be segmented by age, through ￿rms posting
contracts that specify applicant age.
Second, our paper relates to the literature on match quality and learning. Jovanovic
(1979, 1984) develop models of the labor market in which gradual learning of the match
quality leads to a decline in separation probability and a rise in the average wage as tenure
increases. More recently, Pries and Rogerson (2005) embeds the learning of match quality
into a search and matching model in order to quantitatively explain the di￿erences in
worker turnover between Europe and the U.S.
3In this paper, we build on Esteban-Pretel and Fujimoto (2010), which combines these
two approaches to study the U.S. labor market, and introduce additional features that
capture some important characteristics of the Japanese labor market. We also di￿er from
Esteban-Pretel and Fujimoto (2010) in exploring the implications of a decline in aggregate
productivity, and comparing these to recent experiences in Japan.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains some important
empirical life-cycle facts, as well as several institutional features of the Japanese labor
market. Section 3 presents the model, and Section 4 shows its baseline simulation results.
Section 5 studies the behavior of the model after a productivity decline, and Section 6
concludes and o￿ers a summary of the paper.
2 Key Features of the Japanese Labor Market
In this section, we discuss the Japanese labor market from empirical and institutional
standpoints. We ￿rst document the life-cycle properties of the unemployment, job-￿nding,
and separation rates; we then describe a number of key institutional features that are
included in the model.
2.1 Life-cycle Patterns in the Data
We explore the life-cycle patterns for three of the main variables in the Japanese labor
market, namely unemployment, job separation, and job-￿nding rates. Figure 1 shows the
average values of these variables from 1983 to 2008 for ￿ve-year age groups. The data
displayed in these ￿gures is constructed using the Labor Force Survey and borrowed from
Esteban-Pretel, Nakajima, and Tanaka (2011). The transition rates are quarterly and are
obtained using the same methodology as in Shimer (2007), but they do not include the
out of the labor force status.2 The quarterly transition rates shown in the ￿gures are the
probabilities that a worker moves from unemployment to employment or vice versa during
a three-month period, and therefore take into account all possible paths between the two
states. As we observe in Figure 1, the unemployment rate and the worker transition rates
have a marked age pattern, indicating that the experiences of workers of di￿erent ages are
far from homogeneous. Let us analyze the relevant data in more detail.
2Since the model used in this paper does not include an inactivity state, our de￿nitions of the monthly
job-￿nding and separation rates are as follows: JFRt =
UEt
UEt+UUt and JSRt =
EUt
EUt+EEt, where XYt for
X;Y 2 fE;Ug is the number of workers whose employment state is X in month t   1 and Y in t. Shimer
(2007) calculates those rates as JFRt =
UEt
UEt+UIt+UUt and JSRt =
EUt
EUt+EIt+EEt, where X;Y 2 fE;U;Ig,
which includes an inactivity state.
4Unemployment rate by age is shown in Figure 1a. The average for the sample period
across all ages is 3.4 percent. The unemployment rate has a clear U-shape, with the highest
value being 8.8 percent for the youngest age group (15 to 19). It declines as workers get
older, reaching its lowest point for workers aged 45 to 49, at 2.2 percent, and increases
again to 5.6 percent for the oldest age group in the sample (60 to 64).
The separation rate, whose pattern can be seen in Figure 1b, also displays a U-shape.
The average for all groups is 1.3% per quarter. Separation is highest for workers aged 15
to 19, at 3.9 percent, and lowest for those workers in the 45 to 49 age group, 0.85 percent.
For the oldest workers, those aged 60 to 64, the separation rate is slightly higher than that
of their younger counterparts, with a level of 1.5 percent.
Finally, the job-￿nding rate, shown in Figure 1c, declines as workers age. The average
quarterly ￿nding rate for all workers is 36.1 percent. Young workers just graduated from
junior high-school, high-school, or college (aged 15 to 19 and 20 to 24) have the highest
probability of moving into a job in a given quarter, around 44 percent. The ￿nding rate
begins to decline thereafter, reaching its lowest point for workers in the 60 to 64 age group,
with a level of 21.9 percent per quarter.
In summary, young workers have higher unemployment and separation rates, although
also higher job-￿nding rates. Middle-aged workers have the lowest unemployment and
separation rates, but lower ￿nding rates than very young workers. The oldest workers are
likewise in a di￿cult situation, with higher unemployment and separation rates than those
workers 10 to 15 years younger, and simultaneously the lowest probability of reemployment
should they ￿nd themselves unemployed.
2.2 Some Institutional Features
We now brie￿y review some of the key institutional features of the Japanese labor market,
which we incorporate into our model in Section 3.
First, young workers typically spend considerable time searching for their ￿rst job while
still in school. Hiring processes for university graduates, for instance, can begin as early
as the third year of their studies.3
Secondly, there is broad consensus that Japanese ￿rms generally provide more training
to their employees, especially in comparison with their U.S. counterparts. 4 While limita-
tions in internationally comparable training data have restricted the direct veri￿cation of
3See e.g., Rebick (2005).
4See, e.g., Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) and Mincer and Higuchi (1988), which relate such training to
the greater importance of ￿rm-speci￿c human capital in Japan.
5this viewpoint, some empirical studies have found supporting evidence. 5
Third, ￿ring regular workers who are hired for an inde￿nite period is di￿cult in Japan.
This condition is not obvious from a written labor law. For example, the Labor Standards
Law, Article 20, states that an employer must pay no less than 30 days of average wage
when failing to provide the employee with a 30-day advance notice of dismissal. This may
seem to imply that an employer can freely dismiss a worker by paying a month of average
wages: in reality, dismissal is severely restricted by the doctrine of abusive dismissal ( kaiko
ken ranyo houri).6
Fourth, a mandatory retirement system is prevalent. In 2002, 88% of ￿rms, and 95% of
companies with more than 5000 employees, had a uniform mandatory retirement system. 7
The typical age of mandatory retirement was 55 in the 1970s, but 60 is currently most
common. Often, workers who have reached the retirement age are re-employed by the
same employer, but on ￿xed-term contracts.
3 Model
We now develop a search and matching model of the labor market to account for the
empirical facts described above. In order to study life-cycle issues, we depart from the
standard speci￿cation by assuming that workers live only for a ￿nite number of periods.
Another important feature of our model is that matches di￿er in their quality, which is
revealed at the start of the matches only with a certain probability. We show that this
uncertainty in match quality is important to account for the data. Furthermore, we include
several features to capture speci￿c characteristics of the Japanese labor market, such as
young workers’ search before entering the labor market, or the restrictions to dismiss
workers. We now examine the model in greater detail.
3.1 Environment
Time is discrete and runs to in￿nity. There are two agents in the economy, ￿rms and
workers, who try to meet in the labor market and form one-to-one employment relation-
ships. Firms are ex ante homogeneous, and post vacancies by paying ￿ow cost k > 0.
Workers are in the labor market for T periods, although they start searching for jobs while
5Krafcik (1990) reports that in the automobile industry, the average hours of training in Japanese plants
and Japanese-owned transplants in the U.S. are substantially greater than that in U.S.-owned plants.
6This doctrine has been developed since the 1950s through jurisprudence, and was recently codi￿ed in
Labor Contract Law of 2008, Article 16. According to the translation by the Japan Institute for Labour
Policy and Training, it reads as ￿A dismissal shall, if it lacks objectively reasonable grounds and is not
considered to be appropriate in general societal terms, be treated as an abuse of right and be invalid.￿
7See OECD (2004), Table 4.1.
6in school, before entering the market. This assumption re￿ects the highly structured and
institutionalized search for jobs in Japan by students in their last year of school, as a result
of which many individuals enter the labor market with a job.8 After the T-th period in the
labor market, a worker retires and exits the model. This T-th period does not in general
coincide with the mandatory retirement age explained in Section 2.2, since many workers
in Japan continue to work beyond the mandatory retirement age. There is a continuum of
workers of each age, and the total mass of workers for each age group is normalized to 1.
Search by ￿rms and workers in the model is random, and the labor market is not
segmented by age. This implies that workers of all ages compete for the same types of
jobs. Firms and workers match according to a constant returns to scale matching function,
m(v;s) = vq (), where v and s are, respectively, the number of vacancies and the number
of searchers, and   v
s is the market tightness. The matching function implies that q ()
is the probability for a ￿rm to match with a worker, or the vacancy ￿lling rate for a vacant
￿rm, and that q () is the job-￿nding rate for an unemployed worker.
Matches in the economy di￿er along several dimensions. First, they di￿er in the age of
the worker, or the proximity to retirement. Second, they are di￿erent in the overall quality
of the match. Each ￿rm-worker pair has a speci￿c match quality,  2 f1;2;:::;Ng,
which is constant throughout the duration of the match. With probability Ra, which may
depend on age, the actual level of  is revealed when the match is formed. With probability
1 Ra, the match quality is unknown at the moment of the match, and is revealed after one
period of employment.9 The distribution of match quality is independent of age, such that
Pr( = n) = n, where
PN
n=1 n = 1. Finally, matches also di￿er in their productivity.
The productivity of a job, , is idiosyncratic to each match and is i.i.d. over time and
across matches. It is drawn every period, including the initial period of the match, from a
distribution G with support [min;max]. The output of a productive match is the product
of these two components, i.e. . In order to start production, the ￿rm needs to pay a cost
c, which may include expenses such as set-up costs or those related to training the worker.
Destruction of matches occurs in three forms. Matches are destroyed at an exogenous
rate . They are also destroyed endogenously if, for a given age and match quality, the
idiosyncratic productivity is so low that the match surplus is negative. Both exogenous and
endogenous destruction may occur for a newly formed match; a match may be immediately
destroyed after being formed. Furthermore, a match is destroyed when the worker turns
8We recognize that students’ job search processes in Japan di￿er substantially with education level. This
assumption attempts to capture, in a very simple way, a broad feature of such job searches by students.
9Since idiosyncratic productivity  and output  are observed without noise,  is revealed after one
period of employment. It is possible to introduce more complicated scenarios of learning, but we adopt
this simple learning process since our main emphasis is not on the theoretical aspects of learning.
7age T and retires. When a match is destroyed endogenously, the ￿rm needs to pay a cost
Fa. Note that Fa may depend on age, which allows a re￿ection of the general di￿erence in
job security before and after the mandatory retirement age in Japan.
Finally, we assume that wages in the match are determined as the Nash solution to a
bargaining problem, and that there is free entry of ￿rms.
3.2 The Problem of the Agents
The Problem of the Firm
Firms post vacancies in the labor market, and if matched with a worker, decide whether
to start producing or to remain as a vacant ￿rm. The present discounted value of posting
a vacancy, denoted by V , can be expressed as:
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The value V is composed of the ￿ow cost of posting a vacancy, k, and the continuation
value. A ￿rm discounts the future at rate  2 (0;1), and is matched with a worker with
probability q (). If it is matched with a worker in its last year of school (aged  3 to 0,
since the model is quarterly), the ￿rm stops searching until the worker turns age 1, and
receives the expected discounted value of having matched with such worker. If the worker
is already in the labor market (aged 1 to N), the ￿rm receives the corresponding expected
value. If the ￿rm does not ￿nd a worker, it receives the value of vacancy.
The ￿rm’s expected value of being matched depends on the age of the worker, where
a is the fraction of individuals of age a in the pool of workers searching for a job,10 and
whether the quality of the match is revealed before starting production (which occurs with
probability Ra for a worker of age a) or not. The revealed match quality equals n with
10In particular, a =
sa PT 1
a= 3 sa
, where sa is the number of searchers of age a, and the number of searchers
is the number of students without a job o￿er plus the number of unemployed workers for age larger than
0. Formally, s 3 = 1, sa = [1   q ()]sa 1 for a 2 f 2;:::;0g, and sa = ua for a 2 f1;:::;T   1g.
8probability n.
We denote by e J0
a;n the expected continuation value for a ￿rm of a newly ￿lled job with
known match quality n with a worker of age a. This value, if the match is not exogenously
destroyed (which occurs at rate ), is composed by the choice between the value of being a
vacancy and that of being a newly ￿lled ￿rm with a worker of age a, known match quality
n and idiosyncratic productivity , that is, J0
a;n (). If the match is exogenously destroyed,
the ￿rm receives the value of being a vacancy.
We can similarly de￿ne e J0
a as the expected continuation value for a ￿rm, before knowing
the match quality, of a newly ￿lled job with a worker of age a. In this expression, J0
a ()
represents the value for a ￿rm of a newly ￿lled job, with unknown match quality, with a
worker of age a and idiosyncratic productivity .
The expression for the value for a ￿rm of an existing match with a worker of age a,
match quality n, and idiosyncratic productivity , is:
Ja;n () = n   wa;n () + 
h


















A productive ￿rm produces n and pays wages wa;n () in the current period. The follow-
ing period, which is discounted at rate , the ￿rm receives the expected continuation value
of being in a match with a worker one period older, if the worker does not retire. If the
worker retires, the ￿rm becomes vacant. We denote by e Ja;n the ￿rm’s expected continua-
tion value of an existing match of quality n with a worker of age a.11 This value depends
on the probability that the match is exogenously destroyed, , and on the expected value
of idiosyncratic productivity . The ￿rm decides, given , whether to continue with the
match, or to dissolve it and pay the ￿ring cost Fa.
If the ￿rm is starting a new employment relationship with a worker, it needs to pay an
initial cost c before starting production. Hence,
J0
a;n () = n   w0
a;n ()   c + 
h
















Ia<T e Ja+1;n + (1   Ia<T)V
i
; (4)
11Note that although Ia<T = 0 for a = T, technically we still need to de￿ne the expected continuation
value for a ￿rm that is hiring a retiring worker. We set this value to e JT+1;n = V .
9where w0
a () is the initial wage, negotiated based on the expected, not the actual, value of
.
The Problem of the Worker
A worker looks for a job while in the last year of school or when unemployed. The value
of being unemployed for a worker of age a is:12
Ua = b + Ia<T
(






































An unemployed worker receives a ￿ow value b, which captures the value of leisure, home
production, and unemployment bene￿ts. The following period, if the worker does not
retire, the worker is matched with a ￿rm with probability q (), and if the match is not
exogenously destroyed, the worker decides whether to start working for a ￿rm or to remain
unemployed. The value of employment for the worker depends on whether the match
quality is immediately revealed, and on the value of the idiosyncratic productivity.
We denote the value of employment at a newly formed match for a worker of age a as
W0
a;n () and W0
a (), depending on whether the match quality is immediately revealed and
of value n, or is not yet known. The expressions for these two values are:
W0
a;n () = w0
a;n () + Ia<Tf Wa+1;n; (6)
W0
a () = w0





a;n () and w0
a () are the wages paid by the ￿rm, and f Wa;n is the expected contin-
uation value of an employment relationship of quality n for a worker of age a and who is
12If an individual is matched with a ￿rm while in school, he stops searching and waits until the age
of 1, at which moment he becomes either employed, or unemployed in the unlucky case of an immediate
dissolution of the match. Therefore there is no decision to be made before an individual enters the labor
market, hence it is not necessary to write the value of search for a person still in school.
10not retiring,13 and which is de￿ned as














The previous expression depends on the value of employment for a worker of age a, at
an ongoing match with quality n and idiosyncratic productivity ; which is given by an
equation very similar to those for newly formed matches:
Wa;n () = wa;n () + Ia<Tf Wa+1;n: (8)
3.3 Surpluses, Wages, Thresholds, and Flows
Surplus
When a ￿rm and a worker enter into an employment relationship, the match generates a
surplus that is de￿ned as the sum of what both agents gain from the match minus what
they lose: Sa;n ()  Ja;n ()+Wa;n () Ua V +Fa, S0




a ()  J0
a () + W0
a ()   Ua   V .
Since the idiosyncratic productivity of the match, , is i.i.d. and drawn every period, the
continuation values for the di￿erent states of the agents do not depend on the current value
of . Using the previous de￿nitions of the match surplus as well as the value functions from
above, it is easy to show that the surplus of the match is a strictly increasing function of .
Given the assumption of wages being set as the Nash solution to a bargaining problem, it
is also evident that the model satis￿es the reservation productivity property, as is standard
in this literature. In other words, there exists a single threshold for , below which the
termination of the match is optimal for both the ￿rm and the worker. Such a threshold
corresponds to the value of  that makes the match surplus zero. These thresholds, whose
expressions are stated later, are denoted as  a;n,  0
a;n and  0
a for the surpluses Sa;n ();
S0
a;n () and S0
a (), respectively.
13As in the problem of the ￿rm, we need to de￿ne the expected continuation value for a worker who is





T+1;n () = UT+1 = 0 8.
11Using the previous value functions, we obtain the following expressions for the surpluses:



















































nSa;n ()   c   Fa: (11)
Note that starting from a = T, we can recursively establish up to a = 1 that Sa;n () is
strictly increasing in n. This is natural, since the current match quality does not a￿ect
the worker’s outside option value.
Wages
Wages are determined according to generalized Nash bargaining between the matched ￿rm
and worker. Therefore, wages for an ongoing match solve the following optimal problem:
max
wa;n()
(Ja;n ()   V + Fa)
1  (Wa;n ()   Ua)
 ;
where  is the bargaining power of the worker. The wages on newly formed matches,
w0
a;n () and w0
a (), solve a similarly de￿ned problem except there are not ￿ring costs.
The solution to the previous problem delivers a sharing rule that implies that both ￿rm
and worker get a constant share of the surpluses equal to their bargaining power (i.e.,
Ja;n ()   V + Fa = (1   )Sa;n () and Wa;n ()   Ua = Sa;n ()). The expression for
wages are:
wa;n () =  [n + Fa   Ia<T (1   )Fa+1] (12)
+ (1   )
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nwa;n ()    (c + Fa): (14)
Threshold
The separation thresholds are de￿ned as the level of idiosyncratic productivity that makes











































Since Sa+1;n is increasing in the match quality n as mentioned earlier, these expressions
imply that the destruction thresholds are decreasing in n. Therefore, workers who are in
a better quality match are less likely to leave the match.
For newly created matches, the threshold is given by
 0
a;n =  a;n +
1
n
(c + Fa) (16)









nn a;n + c + Fa
!
; (17)
when the match quality is not revealed.14
Flows
We normalize the population for every age group to unity, and assume that workers start
searching for jobs in the last period of school. Since the model is quarterly, this implies
that the number of searchers at age a =  3 is s 3 = 1. For the following three quarters,
students keep searching for jobs if they have not matched with a ￿rm, which implies
14The values computed using equations (15)￿(17) may lie outside the domain of the idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity, [min;max]. In such cases, we restrict the threshold value to equal the adequate boundary.
13that sa = [1   q ()]sa 1 for a 2 f 2;:::;0g. In turn, this means that the number of
unemployed workers at age zero is u0 = s0. Using the ￿nding and separation rates derived
from the above conditions, we can express the stock of workers in each of the possible
states for a 2 f1;:::;T   1g as:
1 = ua + ea; (18)
ua =
"
























[ + (1   )G( a;n)]ea 1;n; (19)
ea = ea 1  
N X
n=1
( + (1   )G( a;n))ea 1;n











































where ua and ea are the number of unemployed and employed workers of age a, and ea;n
is the number of employed workers of age a in a match with quality n.







e = 1   u: (24)
Equilibrium
We assume that there is free entry of ￿rms into the labor market in equilibrium. This
implies that the equilibrium value of posting a vacancy is zero, V = 0, which in turns
14implies the following condition for vacancy posting:


































for a 2 f1;2;:::;Tg and n 2 f1;2;:::;Ng
such that (i) the surpluses are consistent with the agents’ problems and satisfy equations
(9) to (11); (ii) separation decisions are individually e￿cient and satisfy equations (15) to
(17); (iii) expected pro￿t from posting a vacancy is zero, and satis￿es equation (25); (iv)
the probabilities of ￿nding a worker/￿rm are consistent with the matching function; and
(v) the implied employment and unemployment are consistent with the above conditions
and satisfy the ￿ow equations (18) to (24).
Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium are con￿rmed by solving the equilibrium
equations backwards, starting from a = T.
4 Results
In order to examine the quantitative implications of the model, we calibrate it to match
key facts of the Japanese labor market for the period 1983-2008. We then compare the
life-cycle implications of the model with the patterns observed in actual data.
4.1 Parameterization
We set a model period to one quarter, and set the discount factor  to 0:99. We assume
working life to be 50 years, corresponding to age 15￿64. This implies T = 200, and workers
reach the mandatory retirement age of 60 at a = 181.
We assume that the matching function is Cobb-Douglas, m(u;v) = uv1 . Both the
worker’s bargaining power  and the unemployment elasticity of matches  are set to 0:5,
which are conventional choices in the literature. There is no consensus in the literature
on the distribution of , so for simplicity, we assume it follows a uniform distribution,
  U [0;1].
The remaining parameters are determined such that the steady state of the model
matches speci￿c long-run labor market facts for Japan. Following Shimer (2005), we nor-
malize  to equal 1 in the steady state, and choose the vacancy cost k such that the zero
15pro￿t condition for posting a vacancy, eq (25), holds for  = 1. We set the training cost
c to 1.48 times quarterly average output, following Merz and Yashiv (2007)’s estimate of
marginal hiring cost in the U.S.15 We choose the value of b to be 71 percent of average
wage, following Hall and Milgrom (2008). We select the scaling parameter of the match-
ing function  to match the unemployment rate of the youngest age group, 8.78 percent,
and the exogenous separation rate  to match the separation rate of the same group, 3.91
percent.
While it is widely accepted that the dismissal of workers is di￿cult in Japan, quan-
titative evaluation of ￿ring costs is a complex task that has not been performed in the
literature. There is a further complication due to a common practice, explained in Sec-
tion 2.2, by which workers who have reached retirement age are often reemployed on a
￿xed-term basis, hence with less job security. Here, we assume that Fa = fy for workers
of age a < T   20, and Fa = fo for those of age a  T   20; we then choose fy such that
￿ring costs equal two quarters of the average wage for workers before the age of mandatory
retirement, and set fo to fy=6, corresponding to ￿ring costs of average monthly wage for
workers in the last ￿ve years in the labor market.16
The parameters related to match quality are chosen as follows. We assume that the
probability of immediate revelation of match quality Ra declines linearly with age a: Ra =
ra (a   1) for a 2 f1;2;:::;Tg. The coe￿cient ra is calibrated to match the average of
job separation rates for the ten ￿ve-year age groups, 1.58 percent. The idea behind this
formulation of Ra is that, prior to entering an employment relationship, it is di￿cult to
assess the match quality of young workers who have little employment history. As workers
accumulate labor market experience, such assessment should become easier. We assume
that n lies on N = 20 grid points,17 equispaced on the interval [1;N], with equal
probability. We normalize 1 to 1, and calibrate N to match the average unemployment
rate for all age groups for the period of study, 4:15 percent.
Table 1 summarizes the resulting parameters.
15Hahn (2009) uses the same calibration target for this variable. This value is larger than 32 percent of
the quarterly average wage, the target used in Esteban-Pretel and Fujimoto (2010) for the U.S. economy,
based on the discussion in Mortensen (1994). In this paper, we adopt this larger target value, in order to
re￿ect the widely accepted view that Japanese ￿rms exert large e￿orts in training their employees.
16We consider this to be more appropriate than assuming zero ￿ring costs for those workers over the
mandatory retirement age, since workers on ￿xed-term contracts, while enjoying far less job security than
regular workers, cannot be dismissed before the end of the contracts, except in unavoidable circumstances
(Labor Contract Law, Article 17(1)).
17Our numerical results are not very sensitive to the value of N as long as it is su￿ciently large.
164.2 Simulation Results
We now compare the unemployment, separation, and job-￿nding rates predicted by the
model with those in the Japanese data. Since the model is quarterly, we take the averages
for 20-period groups for the model results, in order to have them correspond with their
empirical counterparts shown in Section 2, which are averages for ￿ve-year age groups.
To facilitate the explanation of key mechanisms behind the model predictions, we present
the results in the following order: job-￿nding rate, job separation rate, and unemployment
rate.
Figure 2c shows the job-￿nding rate in the model and in the data. While the pa-
rameterization of the model targets none of the job-￿nding rates in the data, the model
successfully generates a decline in this rate as workers age, and matches the data very well.
Combination of a ￿nite horizon and uncertainty regarding the quality of matches is key to
delivering a decline in this rate.
Since workers retire in a ￿nite number of periods, the expected value of hiring a worker
declines with worker age, all other things being equal. This is the horizon e￿ect. All
workers have equal probabilities of being matched with ￿rms, since we assume a single
labor market. However, the shorter horizons of older workers make them less valuable
to the ￿rm, and accordingly, ￿rms are more selective when hiring older workers. The
probability that a created match is immediately dissolved thus increases with worker age,
which reduces the ￿nding rate for older workers.
We assume that the probability of immediate match quality revelation is higher for older
workers. The matches that are immediately revealed to be of poor quality are promptly
dissolved and do not become employment relationships, lowering the ￿nding rate for older
workers. In contrast, the quality of matches with young workers is less likely to be im-
mediately revealed, and this provides incentives for both ￿rms and workers to postpone
match dissolution and proceed into the employment relationship.
While the horizon e￿ect is qualitatively important, it is the existence of match qual-
ity, together with the increasing probability, as worker age increases, of its immediate
revelation, that quantitatively dominates the simulation results.
Figure 2b plots the job separation rates in the model and in actual data. The calibration
targets the separation rate of the youngest age group, and it also separately targets the
average of separation rates for ten age groups. The separation rates for age groups other
than the youngest one are determined endogenously in the model. We observe that the
model manages to capture the U-shaped nature of the age-separation pro￿le, and ￿ts the
data fairly well.
17In isolation, the horizon e￿ect yields separation rates that increase with age, via the
same mechanism as for the declining job-￿nding rates. This e￿ect, combined with the
lower ￿ring cost for the oldest age group, generates in the model the rise in separation rate
from the second-oldest to the oldest age group observed in the actual data. Furthermore,
the inclusion of random match quality, combined with horizon e￿ects, causes the model to
reproduce the declining job separation rates for other age groups in the data, due to the
following mechanisms.
The match quality is unknown for many newly-formed matches, but is revealed after
a period of employment, at which point a large proportion of low-quality matches are
terminated. Young workers entering the labor market without a job are likely to be in their
￿rst period of employment, the match quality of which may be unknown. Furthermore,
compared to matches with older workers, a higher proportion of newly-formed matches
with younger workers are of unknown match quality. Finally, the horizon e￿ect makes
the opportunity cost of staying in a low-quality match higher for young workers than for
older ones, causing matches with younger workers to be more likely to be terminated. The
combination of these e￿ects produces separation rates in the model that decline with age,
as observed in the data.
Compared to its empirical counterpart, however, the predicted separation rate declines
more from the youngest to the second-youngest age group. This is a product of the extreme
feature of the model that match quality is revealed after one period of tenure, whereas in
reality, match quality is likely to be perceived over time. The model prediction in this
dimension might be improved through the incorporation of some learning process, as for
example in Pries and Rogerson (2005).18
Finally, Figure 2a plots the unemployment rate in the model and in the Japanese data.
As discussed above, our calibration targets the average unemployment rate and the unem-
ployment rate for the youngest age group, but does not directly target the unemployment
rates for the other age groups. Figure 2a shows that the model predicts the life-cycle
pattern of unemployment rates quite well. The model delivers the sharp decline in unem-
ployment for workers in the early years of their working lives, the much slower decline after
the age of 30, and the rise in unemployment for ages 60 and above. Such model predictions
for the unemployment rate can be understood as the combined e￿ects of the separation
and job-￿nding rates. Workers enter the labor market without a job, and despite high ￿nd-
18In Pries and Rogerson (2005), endogenous separation occurs only in the period in which match quality
is revealed; all separations beyond that period are exogenous. Introducing learning into our framework,
in which endogenous separation occurs throughout the match due to ￿uctuations in its idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity, is a challenging task since the presence of two di￿erent sources of uncertainty complicates the
learning mechanism.
18ing rates, are more likely to quickly separate from ￿rms and become unemployed. These
three factors combine to produce higher unemployment rates for young workers, which
decline as workers age, ￿nd higher-quality matches, and separate less often. Furthermore,
a decline in the job-￿nding rate, combined with a rise in separation rate, generates a high
unemployment rate for the oldest age group.
Importantly, the predicted levels of the all three variables of interest are close to those
in the actual data for the youngest age group. While we are calibrating the model to obtain
such a ￿t for the separation and unemployment rates, the model endogenously yields such
prediction for the job-￿nding rate, and our assumption that workers start searching for a
job before entry into the labor market turns out to be crucial in achieving this result. In
fact, without this assumption, the predicted job-￿nding rate for the youngest age group is
far too high compared to the data.
5 Labor Market Changes Due to Productivity Decline
During the 1990s, Japan su￿ered one of the most severe recessions of the post-war world
economy; many hypotheses have attempted to explain this deep and prolonged downturn.
One theory that has drawn considerable attention is developed in Hayashi and Prescott
(2002), in which a severe drop in productivity is posited as the cause of the recession. While
the model in Hayashi and Prescott (2002) does not include unemployment, Esteban-Pretel,
Nakajima, and Tanaka (2010) recently showed that the decline in productivity experienced
in Japan during the 1990s can account for the increase in aggregate unemployment observed
in that period. Similarly, Ariga and Okazawa (2011) also build a search model of the
labor markets and study the e￿ects of the productivity changes in the 1990s on aggregate
unemployment. Neither of the latter two papers use a life-cycle model, however.
Both Hayashi and Prescott (2002) and Esteban-Pretel, Nakajima, and Tanaka (2010)
assume that the economy was in an initial steady state during the 1980s, and that the
productivity drop moved it to a di￿erent steady state. We follow this approach and test
if our model, which matches the long-run life-cycle features of the Japanese labor market
well, also reproduces the changes in three variables of interest from the 1980s to the 2000s.
The exercise we perform consists of recalibrating the model to the 1980s averages
(particularly 1983Q1￿1990Q4), where the overall unemployment and the separation rates
were low (2:5 and 1:02 percent on average, respectively) and the ￿nding rate was high (36:7
percent). Then, keeping all parameters at the 1980s level, we reduce productivity by 5 and
10 percent, close to estimates of the average drop in detrended productivity between the
191990s and the 2000s,19 and study if the model is able to capture the rises in unemployment
and separation rates and the drop in the ￿nding rate observed in Japan during the 2000s. 20
More precisely, we assume that the ￿ow output of a match is now p, where p is aggregate
productivity, taking the value of p = 1 in the initial steady state and p = 0:95 and p = 0:9
in the ￿nal ones.
Figure 3c plots the job-￿nding rate in the model for these three values of p, together
with the data for 1983Q1￿1990Q4 and 2002Q1￿2008Q4. We observe that reducing p in the
model generates a decline in the job-￿nding rate, as is the case in the data for most age
groups from the 1980s to the 2000s. The model decline in the ￿nding rate is due to the
drop in pro￿ts from a match following the fall in productivity, which reduces the incentive
for ￿rms to post vacancies. Numerically, the result for p = 0:95, or a 5 percent drop in
productivity, better captures the empirical change in the job-￿nding rate than that caused
by the larger productivity drop.
The results for the separation rate are shown in Figure 3b. In this case, we observe
that varying the value of p has almost no impact on the separation rate. This is likely the
result of the presence of ￿ring cost in the model, and the decline in the workers’ outside
option values resulting from the lower job-￿nding rate.21
Finally, Figure 3a displays the results for the unemployment rate. We see that the
model generates the rise in unemployment rate when p drops, as observed in the data. It
is the larger drop in productivity, 10 percent, that better captures the actual fall in unem-
ployment, unlike for the ￿nding rate. This is because, following the simulated productivity
drop, unemployment in the model solely increases due to the decline in the job-￿nding
rate, whereas in the data both the job-￿nding and separation rates cause the rise in un-
employment. A larger drop in the ￿nding rate is hence required to match the actual
unemployment increase.
6 Conclusions
The unemployment, job-￿nding, and separation rates are far from homogeneous for workers
of di￿erent ages. In Japan, the unemployment and separation rates display a U-shape,
with young workers having the highest rates, followed by workers close to retirement. The
19The measure of productivity used is output per worker. Productivity dropped by around 9 percent
from the 1983Q1-1990Q4 period to the 2002Q1-2008Q4 period if detrended at 2:4 percent per year, the
average growth rate between 1983Q1 to 1990Q4.
20The precise period used to proxy for the ￿nal steady state is from 2002Q1, when unemployment peaked,
to 2008Q4, which is the end of our sample.
21Prat (2007) ￿nds a similar channel, referred to as the outside option e￿ect, through which a fall in
growth rate, rather than the level of productivity, reduces separations and thus the unemployment rate.
20￿nding rate declines with age, indicating the di￿culties faced by older workers who lose
their jobs towards the end of their careers.
We develop a life-cycle search and matching model of the labor market that features
random match quality and incorporates certain elements capturing the characteristics of
the Japanese labor market. We ￿nd that our model, calibrated to the Japanese economy,
reproduces the life-cycle properties observed in the data. Both the horizon e￿ect and the
uncertainty of the match quality are crucial in delivering the ￿t between the model and the
data. We also show that a drop in productivity, similar in size to that observed in Japan
since the 1990s, produces changes in the unemployment and ￿nding rates in the model of
comparable magnitude to those in the Japanese economy.
The framework developed in this paper, which is stylized but incorporates many realis-
tic components, can be used to study various labor market issues, such as policies related
to youth unemployment, mandatory retirement age, and ￿ring restrictions.
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Exogenous Parameters
Discount factor  0:99
Worker’s bargaining power  0:5
Unemployment elasticity of matches  0:5
Minimum match quality (normalization) 1 1
Distribution of  G U [0;1]
Endogenous Parameters
Scale of matching function  0:44
Cost of posting a vacancy k 0:1512
Initial training cost c 0:981
Unemployment bene￿t b 0:4423
Exogenous separation rate  0:0088
Firing costs for workers before the mandatory retirement age fy 1:246
Firing costs for workers after the mandatory retirement age fo 0.2077
Coe￿cient in the probability of match quality revelation ra 0:0033
Maximum match quality N 1:463
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